

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

887-CAQWU

8 November 1951

SUBJECT: Presentation of Possible Developments within LCBatland.

**TO: Chief, ZACactus
Washington, D. C.**

INFO: Chief, ZACactus

Attn: []

Attn: []

Attn: []

1. Certain incidents within and without LCBatland have occurred and stray but possibly related items of intelligence have been received by BGFland-LQDrink that, when combined, indicate the possible development of a situation involving Pinetree in action too precipitant for comfort. Because part of the information was gleaned in conversation between [] and Kaempfer, Pine's idealized leader, and letters intercepted in LQFlake, we feel that we are the first to gain such an impression. These are the developments that we urge ZHMetel to study:

a. First, we have noticed that unusual emphasis has been given to the dispatching of the Yarbrough special intelligence mission in the month of November.

b. Second, we have [] reports of intercepted letters centering squarely on RNDrawer and implicating RNDrawer, an energetic Yarbrough worker here, in unilateral machinations counter to BGFland-HWHeigh objectives at this critical time. RNDrawer has been issuing instructions to Pinetree through Identity (1), whom [] gave to Pine as a letter drop outlet. BGFland does not possess any explicit instructions passed to Pinetree other than a directive stating that he, RNDrawer, would pass all orders through (1) to Pine. We do not know that (1) has contacted Pine with this information. Identity (1) also has asked RNDrawer to inform Kaempfer of this arrangement, but because of the strong feeling that exists between RNDrawer and Kaempfer we do not believe Kaempfer has been so apprised. Further, there have been no hints dropped in the several recent and long Pasgrove-Kaempfer meetings that Kaempfer was aware of RNDrawer's scheme.

c. Third, for the first time since BGFland contacted Kaempfer in April 1951, Kaempfer has offered a list, by name, age, and area, of 50 men in LQFlake who are willing to return to LCBatland in force with Kaempfer and Kaempfer along.

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Another list of 50 men was offered under the leadership of Kaempfer's son. In the same unusual instance, Kaempfer presents with a special team, Identities (2) (3) (4) (5) and (6) to contact on a personal basis (7) of (8) who would defect his command to the nationalist effort, also (9) of (10), and (11) who has served at (8).

d. For the first time since Pinetree was infiltrated in May, Kaempfer has urged a concentration of arms and ammunition in the resupplying of Pine.

e. Fourth, in both SI letters from Pine (June and August), BGFriend was asked to bless the development of a "free Zone" of resistance in their area (See 6997). That sanction was never given. Now, in the first W/T contact with the team, Pine pointedly asks for arms without any reference to the free zone. It is important to note that the arms drop was called for no later than 25 November.

2. Contrary to the belief recorded in the TPCredo Friend/Valuable conference that 1953 was the year of action in LCBatland (and 1952 the year of decision), all BGFriend-LCDrink, RNPestal, Kaempfer, and the 13 BGFriend exfiltrates (See "Team Briefings") are of the opinion that 1952 just as likely may be the year of action, inadvertently or otherwise. You will note as an example that Kaempfer now appears unusually anxious to mount his kind of strike at the earliest; obviously he has found sufficient basis in his own intelligence. Whether the will to resist turns to desperation or submission is difficult to predict, particularly in view of the wretched living conditions within the country. Desperate or premature action, especially if triggered by RMDrawer or Yarborough or Kaempfer or the people inside, or any combination thereof, may not necessarily await official policy pronouncements from high places. That such action would be near-disaster is not denied, especially in view of the mysterious intentions of Kevil. The point is, however, that the situation is to be dictated by events, and we will may not be in control of these events. Worse still would be a premeditated undercutting of our efforts by an RMDrawer or a Yarborough.

3. As for immediate dangers, BGFriend can control Kaempfer, his plan, and his proposed force until we are in a position to employ them - unless, of course, some other interested service proves more appealing than BGFriend. Pinetree now has been directed to accept instructions from BGFriend via W/T and SI only. And, rather than make the forthcoming resupply drop exclusively one of weapons, as requested, we propose to exert a reasonable limitation at this time and until the situation clears.

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4. We believe that ZRMetal, not having the advantage of some of our sources, will appreciate this analysis and look upon our findings with the same degree of concern that prompted their writing. Whatever are the final conclusions, the fact remains that the timetable given this project binds our preparations and not the possibilities.

5. Your earliest response would be most appreciated.

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